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As a preliminary comment it is worth noting that this title, as it stands, “On the Subject 
of Da-sein’s Psyche” would make little sense for a Heideggerian, initially because the 
title suggests that Da-sein has a psyche, in the sense that one would be going along with 
the division between psyche and soma, or some version of mental functioning in 
distinction to bodily functioning. Dasein is neither. And secondly because the title 
suggests that Da-sein’s psyche can be the subject of some statement, concern or 
investigation, in the sense that we have a subject and predicate relation. Each of these 
would constitute an errancy derived from the legacy of our modernity in the Cartesian 
cogito. And yet, I would contend that the title is not so odd for a Lacanian who has 
traced Lacan’s occasional references to Heidegger, and his supposed stated fidelity to 
what Heidegger has spoken. My aim in this paper is to engage with this relation 
between Heidegger and Lacan and attempt to think some implications for how 
psychoanalysis is understood. But first some caveats. 
 
No-one less than Alain Badiou has provided the warning: 
 
It is always perilous to approach Lacan from a philosophical point of view. For he is an 
anti-philosopher, and no-one is entitled to take this designation lightly. Considering him 
in relation to the Pre-Socratics is a still more risky undertaking. References to these 
thinkers in Lacan’s work are rare, scattered, and above all mediated by something other 
than themselves. There is, moreover, the risk of losing one’s thought in a latent 
confrontation between Lacan and Heidegger, which has all the attraction of a rhetorical 
impasse. 
 
 
Needless to say, this warning from Badiou serves as an introduction to his text “Lacan 
and the Pre-Socratics” in which he does approach Lacan from the perils of a 
philosophical view-point and does run up that cul-de-sac of Heidegger avec Lacan. I am 
mentioning Badiou here as a reminder that my aim is not to see how badly Lacan read 
Heidegger, nor how closed off Heidegger was to psychoanalysis, nor to discover that at 
the end of the day they were both talking about the same things. Rather, I want to 
explore what I see to be most decisive for each thinker, and this will have a pivotal 
focus on their understanding of logos, language as it is thought through in Heidegger’s 
1951 text on Heraclitus, the one Lacan translated in 1956. It is interesting that Badiou 
characterised Lacan as an anti-philosopher, a designation not to be taken lightly. But 
what would this designation, “anti-philosopher,” mean? How would we come to 
understand it? Even without clearly knowing what philosophy is, or a philosopher, we 
would already have a sense that an anti-philosopher, as in an anti-X would be entirely 
designated by philosophy or by X, would be within the orbit or frameworks of 
philosophy or X such that a designation of opposition would already be defined by the 
border regions of whatever was being opposed. Is this what Badiou was intimating with 
respect to Lacan, that there is something oppositional in Lacan’s thinking that does not 
allow him to break from philosophy?  
 
And how goes it with Heidegger on the question of philosophy and being a 
philosopher?  We understand that for Heidegger the pre-Socratics thought Philia and 
Sophia in a glimpse of the openness to being, to the being of beings, and hence never 
thought them in the belonging together that was subsequently thought by Plato and 
Aristotle, for whom Philia and Sophia were already closed to the question of being, 
while philosophy asked the question of the truth of beings as beings, truth as 
correctness, truth as adequation, found in representation of an object for a subject. 
With the inauguration of metaphysics and the long errancy of philosophy, Heidegger 
will come to question the designation “philosopher” for himself and adopt the 
designation “thinker” for the task of thinking. Perhaps we would not call him an anti-
philosopher, though his relation to the tradition was clearly a confrontation with respect 
to the history of metaphysics, and particularly the question of truth as the truth of 
beings as beings and, after Descartes, the oblivion of being, as the forgetting of the 
ground of metaphysics. So, perhaps from one vantage point we are able to open a 
region for thinking Heidegger along with Lacan that does not commence with the false 
register of an insurmountable disciplinary difference between philosophy and 
psychoanalysis, particularly as both thinkers were radical precisely in the fundamental 
questioning of their fields and the disciplinary borders they undid. 
 
Let’s see what is going on with Lacan. Clearly in the early 1950s he is reading 
something of Heidegger. Commentators have noted the influence in his “Discourse at 
Rome” in 1953, “The function and field of speech and language in psychoanalysis.” It 
is this paper that consolidates Lacan’s understanding of the unconscious as the 
discourse of the Other, but crucially Lacan arrives at this through an interrogation of 
the historicising of the subject who knows. Muller and Richardson, in Lacan and 
Language suggest: 
 
What is clear for Lacan is that the “subjectivity” of the subject includes more than what 
has been experienced “subjectively,” i.e., consciously by him. That is why the “truth of 
his history is not all contained in his script.” There is a larger text that supports his 
discourse, although he himself may know “only his own lines.” The larger text Lacan 
calls “the discourse of the Other,” “the unconscious” in its strictest sense. It is to this 
larger text, not speech but language, that he now turns. 
 
I want to emphasise that the question of language for Lacan cannot be separated from a 
question of temporality as a radical historicising of the subject. There will ensue for 
Lacan two recourses to settle this primordial relation. Unfortunately these two 
recourses, taken up intensely are not reconcilable. One will be the positivism of 
structural anthropology that developed from work done in linguistics, particularly 
Jakobson, and culminating in Levi Strauss’s own pronouncements on the unconscious 
that is structured by language; the other will be the phenomenological hermeneutics of 
Heidegger. Each presents a radical understanding of the temporality of the existent, 
and construes a fundamental orientation to the question of language outside of any 
instrumental understanding of human being as a speaking animal. The “It speaks” of 
Lacan’s structural linguistics will be said to coincide with the “Speech speaks” of 
Heidegger. Yet, they fundamentally differ in that structural anthropology, and Lacan’s 
pursuits from within its framing, approaches the question of beings from the beingness 
of the beings that are; it remains closed to what is decisive for Heidegger: human being 
as that being in the world who is radically open to being. Dasein is openness to being. 
In as much as Lacan approaches Heidegger, he will in my reckoning not accept this 
essential scope of Heidegger’s project, and will remain within a questioning of beings as 
beings. This is hardly a failing on Lacan’s part in the sense that Heidegger is little 
concerned with correct readings of the Heideggerian corpus. Rather he is concerned 
with what horizons of disclosure happen and what paths of thinking happen. However, 
we may emphasise that the radicality of structuralism’s emphasis on synchrony over 
diachrony opens the question of the historicising of the subject to a radical 
displacement such that Lacan may pose that the unconscious is structured like a 
language, meaning that the unconscious is not considered as a repository of content 
over time from infantile to adult repressions. Freud’s fundamental diachrony of the 
historical subject is displaced by the synchronic structure of the law of the Symbolic as 
the Discourse of the Other.  
 
This is hardly reconcilable to Heidegger’s ecstatic temporality as the primordial 
structure to Dasein’s being in the world. And yet it is to Heidegger’s Being and Time 
that Lacan turned in his 1953 text, to emphasise, contra Freud, an understanding of the 
subject’s finitude via Heidegger’s being-for-death. Contra Freud in the sense that death 
in this instance runs against the grain of Freud’s understanding of the death instinct. 
There is an interesting complexity here because what is fundamentally at stake, again, is 
temporality understood as repetition. Lacan suggests in a sense that the death instinct 
was Freud’s thought of thoughts: “the key to this mystery [of the lack of mastery of the 
analyst in negative therapeutic reaction], it is said, is the agency of a primordial 
masochism – in other words, in the pure manifestation of that death instinct whose 
enigma Freud propounded for us at the height of his experience.” Freud is influenced 
by his reading of the pre-Socratic Empedocles.  
 
As with Heraclitus and Parmenides, we note that for Empedocles physis and being are 
the same (which should not be thought of as being identical). Freud understands this 
metaphysically as there being no differentiation between mind and nature. Where 
Heraclitus offers Philia, physis and polemos as primordial names for being, 
Empedocles will name Philia and neikos, where neikos is understood as discord. Freud 
will locate his dual principles of Eros and Thanatos, though the openness of these 
names as the naming of being, rather than the beingness of beings that are will be 
closed to him. Lacan’s reading of Heidegger’s Logos as a meditation on the Heraclitan 
glimpse of being would have opened his own reading of Freud on Empedocles as a 
levelling off of thinking with respect to a question of being. And it would only have 
been reinforced by the fundamental ontology at stake in Heidegger’s understanding of 
being-for-death, which has been all too easily misread in commentaries as some kind of 
preoccupation of the Heideggerian “subject” with her own demise. If Heidegger was 
discussing our ontical engagements with the world by this term, that would then surely 
be what he had meant. But as an ontological concern, it concerns the being of human 
being disclosed in the fundamental structure of our human being in the world.  
 
Crucial to that structure is our finitude. But such a notion of finitude runs counter to 
our metaphysical tradition which is also an onto-theology that will pose infinity, the 
infinite, synonymous with the highest being, in the belonging of the primordial essence 
of human being to the infinity of the highest being. The radicality of Heidegger in part 
is that the being of human being is finite, being as such is finite. If Dasein is 
primordially openness to being as the potential for Dasein to be, in what way is Dasein 
finite? If this openness to being is the futural possibility to be, in what way can we say 
for Dasein there is the totality of being in the world? In the face of this open possibility 
there is a certainty for Dasein that is not ontical but ontological. This certainty is death. 
It is Dasein’s own-most possibility, its authentic possibility in the sense that no other 
Dasein can go along with my death in the sense of experiencing it. 
 
Yet crucial for Heidegger, Dasein does not essentially exist as a being who experiences 
its existence as a series of now moments from its birth up to its death. Although in our 
average everydayness, and with, for example the counting of our birthdays, we go along 
with our historicity as just such a sequence. Yet, essentially our temporality is ecstatic, 
which means our futural possibility as openness to being is understood within an 
horizon of disclosure opened by our thrownness as our having been. Our finitude 
arrives in the sense of a pastness that is futural. The three ecstaces of temporality, 
pastness, futurity and presentness do not exist in a sequence but rather are 
equiprimordial as the temporality of the being of our being in the world. Muller & 
Richardson suggest in their reading of the 1953 text: 
 
Lacan’s transition to the Heideggerian conception [of death] is by way of the notion of 
historicity he comes to when speaking of the repetition compulsion. Freud suggests that 
this compulsion is best dealt with by searching out the prototypic experience that the 
subject compulsively repeats through careful analysis of the transference. ... This 
process Lacan describes by a non-Freudian formula – “the historicizing temporality of 
the experience of transference” – adding immediately that in similar fashion “the death 
instinct essentially express[es] the limit of the historical function of the subject. This 
limit is death.” 
 
Lacan suggests: “this limit is at every instant present in what history possesses as 
achieved. This limit represents the past in its real form, that is to say, … the past which 
reveals itself reversed in repetition.” He footnotes this phrase, “reversed in repetition” 
indicating that he has inserted this wording in the place of what he previously phrased 
as “always present in the eternal return,” suggesting a repetition of Nietzsche’s ecstatic 
temporality via Heidegger. The past reveals itself “reversed in repetition” in the sense 
that for Heidegger repetition is Dasein’s “explicit handing over to itself” of its past, a 
“return upon possibilities of Dasein” as it has been. Dasein’s future advances through 
its past. (Muller & Richardson 92). However, Lacan becomes at this moment decidedly 
Hegelian. We need to remember a fundamental task for psychoanalysis outlined by 
Lacan: “The undertaking of the psychoanalyst acts in our time as a mediator between 
the man of care [i.e., Heidegger’s Dasein] and the subject of absolute knowledge [i.e., 
Hegelian dialectics].” If I intimated the difficulties we encounter in Lacan’s two legacies 
of temporality and language in structuralism and phenomenology, negotiating Hegel 
and Heidegger makes the former the simpler moment of compromise.  
 
The “repetition” Lacan will allude to will be that of Freud’s fort/da: a repetition 
opening not to a primal masochism but to a mastery of absence, the experience of 
finitude in negation of the (m)other. Logos, “the concrete discourse of the 
environment” in an originary experience of limit, finitude, “lack of being” constitutes 
within a symbolic domain the otherness of the mother not as need but as desire. As 
Lacan emphasises: “born into language” “desire becomes human.” Lacan’s recourse 
here is strictly to an Hegelian formulation of the work of negativity, logos and the place 
of the other. Desire for the mother becomes a desire to be desired by her in turn; to be 
the object of the mother’s desire. This may suggest that Lacan has recourse to read 
Heidegger’s Dasein as openness to being via a particularly Hegelian negativity, such that 
an openness to being will be construed in Dasein’s being-for-death as a fundamental 
deficit or primordial lack of being, a yet-to-be, for which, in Hegelian fashion, the locus 
of the Other will constitute the place of identity, where for Lacan the Discourse of the 
Other is the enunciation of the unconscious structured by the signifier of the lack 
constituting the Other -  the symbolic domain as becoming present of the absence of 
the thing. Such may well have been the case had Heidegger been alluding to beings in 
the world rather than the being of beings when he discussed logos. But then, he would 
no longer have been Heidegger. It is true that Heidegger continually stresses that 
Dasein is futural, is its own possibility and so in this sense is yet to be. But we need to 
have a sense of what Heidegger means by being. 
 
We can get a good sense from the series of four texts produced by Heidegger in the 
late 1940s collected under the title “Early Greek Thinking.” His text “Logos” is 
included with these.  Where the tradition of philosophy has approached the fragments 
of Anaximander, Heraclitus and Parmenides as proto-philosophical thinking, crude in 
a positive sense of unrefined and that which was improved upon by the Platonic-
Aristotelian texts, Heidegger has quite the reverse thinking. For Heidegger, the earliest 
sayings of the meaning of being, as the originary source of our tradition are the most 
vibrant and clearest. The later tradition of metaphysics construes misunderstandings of 
the saying of being, a covering over and forgetting of being, culminating in an oblivion 
of being. Anaximander is the earliest. His saying is the sharpest: being is the jointure, 
the joining or bringing together of nothing to nothing by way of something: “Whatever 
lingers awhile comes to presence from the jointure between approach and withdrawal. 
It comes to presence in the “between” of a twofold absence.” Crucially, for the pre-
Socratics there is no distinction between being and becoming and hence Heidegger can 
find no antagonism between Parmenides and Heraclitus that the tradition up to 
Nietzsche (and including Lacan) found. Being is the presencing of what comes to 
presence in the temporality of its presencing: what comes to presence passes away. 
Being, in its many names says this primordial jointure of separation from and to the 
nothing. For Heraclitus, logos, physis, philia and polemos are all names for this 
primordial jointure.  
 
For the tradition founded by the pre-Socratics, truth had no relation to what 
metaphysics will come to understand by this word in terms of correctness or 
adequation. Primordially there is lethe, hiddenness, concealedness, what stays in its 
hiding. Truth is understood in the privation of this hiddenness, in a-lethia, 
unconcealing of what is, in its showing. The beings that are may be understood in what 
brings them to unconcealedness. It is being that shows them. There is no 
anthropocentrism here, no subject who knows, no world of things. Rather, human 
beings are those beings in the world who can be open to being as such, i.e., to tbe being 
of beings, not willing it, not reasoning it, not having an absolute concept of it, but being 
an openness to it. This is Dasein, and only that. Heidegger emphasises in Logos that 
the Greek root means literally to lay before, or to let-lie-together. More originary that 
any saying or talking, logos was that which alluded to the bringing of that which appears 
and comes forward in its lying before us: “Saying is the letting-lie-together-before which 
gathers and is gathered.” Crucially, logos, this saying is not a speaking in the sense of 
expression and signification. It is a laying and gathering such that something comes to 
appearance. It names being as the joining-separation of concealedness, what 
fundamentally withdraws, and unhiddenness, beings that are in the temporality of their 
being. “This inclination by which rising and self-concealing lean towards each other” is 
for Heraclitus a primordial understanding of philia; while the essential reciprocity of 
philia so understood and physis, the beings that are, constitutes the full essence of 
being. 
 
We can fruitfully turn to Lacan’s understanding of the structure of the unconscious as 
Discourse of the Other in order to get a sense of the extent to which he understands 
and moves with some of Heidegger’s thinking here, and the extent to which he closes it 
off or is closed off to it. What is initially crucial for me is that the Freudian 
unconscious, which Lacan will modify, is fundamentally self-concealing in its bringing 
to unhiddenness what is. Freud glimpses in a fundamental way something essential to 
Heidegger’s questioning of being. Lacan recognises in his own horizon of disclosure the 
structure of this primordial relation of human beings to their world as a self-
withdrawing that discloses in the structuration of language as a symbolic dimension; not 
itself a speaking, but “within” the unconscious a saying as a laying before. The veiled 
phallus is essential to this thinking in its imaginary and symbolic dimensions as the 
nexus of logos as a laying before and gathering that is yet prior to a saying as a speaking. 
Indeed fundamental to Lacan, the locus of one does not coincide with the other. Its 
structural loci will crucially engage philia and polemos, if not exactly using those terms, 
and the open possibility of the existent to be: To the question “What am ‘I’?” Lacan 
suggests: 
 
“I” am in the place from which a voice is heard clamouring “the universe is a deficit in 
the purity of Non-Being.” And not without reason, for by protecting itself this place 
makes Being itself languish. This place is called Jouissance, and it is the absence of this 
that makes the universe vain.  
 
But within the Lacanian formulation what is genuinely lacking, a deficit, is the Other we 
would have come to recognise in Hegelian dialectics as the place from which identity 
takes place. The Other is primordially lacking in the sense that there is no Other of the 
Other. With unconscious enunciation by the subject of the unconscious, the signifier is 
the signifier of a lack in the Other. This Other is the Other of the demand for love, 
whose deficit is the fault the “I” assumes as the speaking being. This will be by way of 
castration. How so? We understand that the speaking “I” takes its place in the self-
referential signifying chain. But from the locus of the signifier of the lack in the Other: 
“the signifier for which all the other signifiers represent the subject: that is to say, in the 
absence of this signifier, all the other signifiers represent nothing.” This signifier is 
inexpressible or unthinkable from the level of the conscious Cartesian cogito. Its 
withdrawal is the clamour of Being in the locus of jouissance.  Submitting to the law of 
the signifier, the speaking subject accepts the consequences of her finitude in the limits 
imposed upon jouissance. Importantly, Lacan will move away from a Heideggerian 
understanding of Being when he comes to recognise the possibility that Being may 
become thought of as an Other to the Other, and hence a metalanguage, as with the 
“language of Being.”  
 
But we can see that Lacan limits his engagement with Heidegger to something like an 
understanding of being derived from metaphysics with its disjuncture between being 
and becoming. This will be crucial. Hence, for example Lacan will often speak of the 
Other in terms of Being (Richardson, Psychiatry & the Humanities, p.140): “The force 
of the unconscious comes from the truth and in the dimension of Being.” But also: 
 
The fundamental relation of man to this symbolic order is quite precisely that which 
founds the symbolic order itself – the relation of non-Being to Being – The end of the 
symbolic process is that non-Being comes to be and this is because it has come into 
words. 
 
But we recognise two crucial divergences from Heidegger in this thinking. For 
Heidegger, Being is essentially the inclining belonging of concealing and unconcealing 
in the while of a coming to presence and passing away. In this sense, and primordially 
being is non-being in the being/becoming that is the laying before of Logos. Secondly, 
for Heidegger the saying that is Logos is more primordial than speaking. Indeed, he 
emphasises that for the Greeks, what we term language as speaking had the word glossa 
(tongue) and that while Heraclitus glimpsed Logos as being, for the tradition this was 
closed off with respect to language. There is no Language of Being for Heidegger, while 
he does suggest that language is the house of being, by which he means the sheltering 
and preserving of what comes to presence in the temporality of its being.  
 
I want to conclude by stressing a couple of things. I am not seeking to provide a 
corrective to Lacan’s reading of Heidegger, truly a dead-end in thinking. Rather, I am 
suggesting that there is something essential that belongs to the thinking of Freud and 
Heidegger that is yet to be engaged with, and that Lacan provides a significant vantage 
for approaching that belonging. It would engage in a thinking of Freud’s great 
disclosure of the unconscious as an inclination that leans to Heidegger’s withdrawal of 
being in the disclosure of beings. Lacan clearly engages the question of being yet from 
the vantage point of a metaphysical framework of the question of being. A task would 
be to ask in what ways we might come to understand Lacanian analysis as a path of 
thinking that opens to an understanding of being-with that may yet have been closed to 
Heidegger in the sense that Lacan does in an original way ask the question of being and 
otherness from the perspective of the withdrawal of the speaking I, as a locus or place 
of the deficit of non-being. This means asking how we might approach Lacanian 
thinking from the vantage point of an outside to philosophy precisely in the sense that 
Heidegger poses it as a task for thinking, or perhaps as an orientation that would dispel 
a closure that may be invoked by Badiou in noting the anti-philosophical stand of 
Lacan. 
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